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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHYLLIS LANG, 
Plaintiff'-Appellant, 
vs. 
J. ROBERT LANG, 
Defendant, 
SAMUEL J. CARTER, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On February 28, 1964, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, a garnishee judgment in 
favor of plaintiff, Phyllis Lang, in the sum of $9,375.00 
was signed, filed and entered against the garnishee-re-
spondent (mistakenly designated intervenor-respondent) 
Samuel J. 'Carter, Executor of the Estate of John Lang, 
deceased. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Upon motion of the garnishee-respondent (interven-
or-respondent), Samuel J. Carter, Executor of the Estate 
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No. 
10225 
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of John Lang, deceased, the Hon. Bay Van Cott, Jr. , a 
judge of said District Court, on July 31, 1964, signed, 
entered and filed an Order setting aside, annulling and 
declaring void the aforesaid garnishee judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Carter, as Executor of the Estate of 
John Lang, deceased, seeks affirmance of the Order 
of the lower court setting aside, annulling, and declaring 
void the aforesaid garnishee judgment against respond-
ent, signed, entered and filed on July 31, 1964. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. As to Record on Appeal. 
Respondent Carter, as Executor of the Estate of 
John Lang, deceased, has filed in this Court and Cause 
his motion to strike from the record on appeal five 
certain documents designated as follows: (a) the Affi-
davit of D. M. Arnoss, attorney for appellant, dated 
August 24, 1964; (b) the Motion of Tracy Collins Bank 
and Trust Company, Trustee-Intervenor, to set aside 
garnishee judgment against said Carter as Executor 
of the Estate of John Lang, deceased, dated February 
28, 1964; (c) the Motion of said Tracy Collins Bank and 
Trust Company as Trustee to intervene in the action of 
Phyllis Lang vs. J. Robert Lang; (d) Order making 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company as Trustee a 
party to the above entitled action; and (e) all documents 
filed in a certain action commenced and pending in said 
Third District Court designated as Civil Action No. 
148659, entitled Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang, 
etc. The bases for said motion are that each and all of 
the said documents are immaterial and irrelavent to the 
issues on appeal in this case; that the Amoss affidavit 
was filed subsequent to the order appealed from and is 
self-serving, and the facts therein alleged are irrelevant 
and immaterial to the issues involved on this appeal; and 
as to (e) supra, the said action No. 148659 and the matters 
involved therein are entirely irrelevant and immaterial 
to the issues involved on this appeal, and that said docu-
ments were not introduced in evidence at the hearing of 
the motion to set aside the garnishee judgment against 
respondent. 
(a) Amoss Affidavit. 
The order appealed from (R-15) was signed by 
Judge Van Cott on July 31, 1964. No motion to modify 
or amend said order was made. The Amoss Affidavit is 
dated August 24, 1964, and was filed in the office of the 
Clerk of the District Court on August 25, 1964. In para-
graph 4 thereof (E-13), the affidavit attempts to set forth 
the proceedings on the argument of a motion to dismiss 
interposed by Wilford Burton, a defendant in Civil 
Action No. 148659 entitled Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs. 
Phyllis Lang, etc., and also to report the decision of the 
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Court on said motion. Amoss was and is attorney for 
the plaintiff-appellant, 
(b) Motion of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Com-
pany to set aside garnishee judgment against Samuel J. 
Carter as Executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased. 
This motion (R-9) was made in the instant action 
after Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company as Trustee 
had been made a party defendant thereto (R-8). The 
motion to set aside said garnishee judgment against 
'Carter as Executor (R-9) was based on the fact that the 
judgments in favor of plaintiff, Phyllis Lang, against 
the defendant, J . Robert Lang, upon which the writ of 
garnishment against said Carter as Executor was issued 
are null and void on the ground that no proper service 
of process was made upon said J. Robert Lang as a 
basis for obtaining any of said judgments. 
(c) Motion of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Com-
pany as Trustee to intervene in the action of Phyllis 
Lang vs. J. Robert Lang (R-9). 
The basis for this motion was that said Tracy 
Collins Bank and Trust Company as Trustee was not 
adequately represented for the protection of its interests 
and that it might be bound by a judgment in said action 
(R-9). 
(d) Order making Tracy Collins Bank and Trust 
Company as Trustee a party to the action (R-8). 
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'Tins order dated Jul)" 2, 1.964, made Trac> 'Collins 
Bank and Trust Company, Trustee, a party to the action. 
(R. 8) 
(e) Documents in the case entitled Samuel J. Car-
ter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang, etc. 
! - is i s Civil A n . . . i • • IM>;,:) 1'ilc; ,r ih.- idistr ict 
r-)i ;- i
 (»r S.M!- Lake C o u n t } , 1 Uih, -MI v . i . v h ">, 1964, b y 
Niiiiii ' : .!. < ;n ic ras an individual and also in his capacity 
as Executor of the Estate and under l! . last will and 
testament of John Lang, deceased, against Phyllis Lang, 
J. Robert Lang, Wilford M. Burton and George Beck-
stead, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah. The file in this 
action was designated by appellant as part of the record 
</;. appall (R-18), iw*\ \---x< ueen transmitted to the 
Supreme i ^uv-. Th- ;rih>i! i>
 ; lr interpleader action 
instituted by < plaintiff therein against the defendants 
therein praying for a judgment <•!' *\u *'• •;,-•' requiring 
them to interplead. It alleges that said Carter in his 
capacity as Executor aforesaid holds the sum of $9,375.00 
to which he makes no claim of interest, but that the de-
fendants have made conflicting demands upon him for 
payment, and that he is unable to determine the rightful 
owner thereof, and is willing t«> pay the same to such 
persons as should be lawfully entitled thereto ' ' 'T< s 
to bring said sum of money into court at such time and 
under such conditions as the court may order and direct. 
The garnishee-appellant filed in the District Court on 
September 15, 1964, his designation of additional record 
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on appeal and objection to the designation by appellant 
of the items particularly described in (a), (b), (c), (d) 
and (e) above (R-21, 22) as being included in the record 
on appeal. 
2. As to the Merits of the Case. 
(a) The garnishee-respondent, Samuel J. Car-
ter, was appointed Executor of the Estate and under 
the last will and testament of John Lang, deceased, 
by an order made, entered and filed in those certain 
proceedings instituted and now pending in the 
Superior Court of the State of California in and 
for the County of Orange, entitled u In the Matter 
of the Estate of John Lang, Deceased." The said 
garnishee-respondent qualified as such Executor 
and has since his appointment been the regularly 
appointed, qualified and acting Executor of said 
estate; said garnishee-respondent has not been ap-
pointed ancillary executor of the Estate of John 
Lang, deceased, by any court of the State of Utah 
•(R-10, 11, and 13). 
(b) The plaintiff, Phyllis Lang, asserts and 
represents that she recovered judgments against the 
defendant, J. Robert Lang, in this action as follows: 
On April 19, 1962, in the amount of $2,800.00 with 
interest and attorney's fees; on March 19, 1963, in 
the amount of $8,350.00 with interest and attorney's 
fees, and on February 26, 1961, in the amount of 
$3,850.00 with interest and attorney's fees (R-9). 
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I t was these judgments that Tracy Collins Bank 
and Trust Company as Trustee attacked by motion 
to set aside the garnishee judgment against the gar-
nishee-respondent. There is nothing in the record on 
appeal that indicates the disposition of this motion. 
(c) Based on the alleged judgments above de-
scribed, the plaintiff on February 27, 1964, caused 
a writ of garnishment to issue against Samuel J . 
Carter, Executor, and a copy of the same was served 
upon the said Carter on February 28, 1964. The 
said Carter, as Executor, responded to the inter-
rogatories contained in said Avrit of garnishment as 
follows: 
"FIRST.—Are you in any manner indebted 
to the defendants, or either of them, either in 
property, or money, and is the same now due? 
If not due, when is the same to become due? 
State fully all particulars. 
"Answer: Yes — As Executor of the Estate 
of John Lang, deceased, in the Superior Court 
of the State of California, in and for the County 
of Orange. 
"SECOND.—Have you in your possession, in 
your charge, or under your control, any property, 
effects, goods, chattels, rights, credits, or choses 
in action of said defendants or either of them, or 
in which he is interested? If so, state what is the 
value of the same, and state fully all particulars. 
"Answer: Yes—As such Executor, I have in 
my possession $9,375 owing to defendant in settle-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ment of an action brought against me as such 
Executor by defendant and others. 
"THIRD.—Do you know of any debts owing 
to the said defendants, whether due or not due, 
or any property, effects, goods, chattels, rights, 
credits, or choses in action, belonging to him, or 
in which he is interested, and now in the posses-
sion or under the control of others? If so, state 
the particulars. 
"Answer: No." 
(d) On February 28, 1964, upon motion of the 
plaintiff, the Court made, entered and filed a gar-
nishee judgment against Samuel J. Carter as the Ex-
ecutor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased, for the 
sum of $9,375,00 (R-14). On the same date the plain-
tiff caused a garnishee execution to issue against 
said Samuel J. Carter as Executor of the Estate 
of John Lang, deceased, (R-5) and it was served 
on the same date (R-6) and returned unsatisfied. 
(e) Samuel J. Carter as Executor of the Estate 
of John Lang, deceased, thereupon moved the Court 
for an order setting aside and nullifying the afore-
said garnishee judgment (R-10,11 and 12). This mo-
tion was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Dis-
trict Court on July 22, 1964 (R-12). On July 31, 
1964 (R-15) Judge Van Cott signed and filed the 
order setting aside said garnishee judgment (R~15), 
and it is from this order that the plaintiff appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MOTION OF GARNISHEE-RESPONDENT 
CARTER, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
JOHN LANG, DECEASED, FILED IN THIS 
COURT AND CAUSE TO STRIKE FROM THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL CERTAIN DOCUMENTS 
AND PAPERS SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
Each document which is the subject of this motion 
will be discussed separately. 
I. Amoss Affidavit. 
(a) This affidavit was filed in the office of the 
Clerk of the District Court on August 25, 1964. The 
order setting aside and nullifying the garnishee 
judgment from which this appeal is taken is dated 
July 31, 1964, and on that date was undoubtedly 
filed in the office of the Clerk of the Court. This 
affidavit was filed subsequent to the order appealed 
from and therefore it cannot be considered part of 
the record on appeal. 
Broads v. Mead, 159 Cal. 765, 116 Pac. 460; 
Southern Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 130 Tenn. 
482, 172S.W. 318; 
Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 29 L.ed. 105, 
5 S.Ct. 788; 
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Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.S. 488, 29 L.ed. 183, 5 S.Ct. 
972; 
Howard v. Howard, 269 Wis. 334, 69 N.W.(2d) 
492; 
Berg v. Griffith, 127 Neb. 501, 256 N.W. 44, 102 
A.L.R, 1124; 
Smolinski v. Kabla, 21 Ohio App. 52, 153 N.E. 
104. 
(b) The affidavit itself contains self-serving 
statements of the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant. 
I t is an attempt on his part to rectify a defect in the 
record on appeal. The Court file in the action of 
Samuel J. Carter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang, etc. (Civil 
Action 148,659) Avas not introduced in evidence at 
the time of the argument of the motion to annul 
and set aside the garnishee judgment. The recital 
of paragraph 4 of this affidavit attempts to correct 
this deficiency. 
(c) Paragraph 4 of the affidavit contains 
declarations which are manifestly the rankest type 
of hearsay. The affiant attempts to recite the oc-
currences at the argument of counsel upon the pre-
sentation of a motion in a separate and distinct 
action. It sets forth facts upon which no issue was 
joined at the hearing on the motion to set aside the 
garnishee judgment. The garnishee-respondent Car-
ter, Exectftor, had no opporunity to meet and 
controvert the allegations of this paragraph. 
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(d) The issue in this instant appeal to be 
determined is whether or not the garnishee judgment 
against the garnishee-respondent is valid. The facts 
set forth in paragraph 4 of the affidavit are en-
tirely immaterial and irrelevant to this issue. There 
can be no problem as to res judicata because the 
order of Judge Anderson denying the motion of 
Burton to dismiss the interpleader complaint was 
not a final judgment upon which such plea could 
be based, 
"***since it is a general rule that a judgment 
sought to be used as a basis for the application 
of the doctrine of res judicata must be final and 
not an interlocutory judgment." (30A Am. Jur . 
— Judgments — Sec. 340, p. 384). 
Preliminary orders such as sustaining or denying 
motions to dismiss are not final judgments which 
can be pleaded as res judicata or estoppel by judg-
ment in another action. Loveless v. Carten, 64 Ga. 
App. 54, 12 S.E.(2d) 715. And an order denying a 
motion to dismiss not being final is not res judicata. 
Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 148 F e d (2d) 128, 
158 L.R.A. 688, 693; cert, denied, 326 U.S. 753, 90 
L.ed. 452, 66 S.Ct. 92. 
"All judicial and academic authority supports 
the rule that the issues which are litigated or may 
be litigated in an action can be finally adjudicated 
only by final judgment on the merits Discontin-
uance or abatement of the action before final 
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judgment leaves the issues open to content in 
other litigation, even though they had been de-
cided provisionally by order entered upon a mo-
tion made in the action or by interlocutory judg-
ment, 
"The test then is not the form of the decision, 
but the nature of the proceedings in which the 
adjudication is made. If in such proceedings the 
jurisdiction of the court is limited in scope so 
that particular questions may be decided only 
provisionally or for a limited purpose, a decision 
in any form can be given effect only within the 
same limits. Thus, a motion to open a default for 
any reason is generally addressed to the discre-
tion of the court, and is in its nature interlocutory. 
Such a motion can never result in a decision of 
the issues involved in the controversy, since it is 
always predicated upon the fact that the default-
ing party has lost the opportunity to present the 
issue to the court, and the question always is 
whether the party applying should be permitted 
to plead." * * * On the other hand, an order 
entered upon the report of a referee on a motion 
to cancel a judgment is conclusive adjudication 
'so far as it covers what was actually and neces-
sarily tried on that reference.' * * * In both cases 
the proceedings were in form motions in an ac-
tion, and in both cases the court was required to 
decide all questions of law or fact presented. The 
distinction is that in the first case the only relief 
which was asked, or which the court could grant, 
upon the motion was provisional in its nature, 
and even if granted, would leave open for subse-
quent conclusive adjudication in the same action 
every issue of fact raised by the pleadings, while 
in the second case, if the application were granted, 
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the questions necessarily decided upon the appli-
cation could not be litigated anew in any litigation 
pending in the same tribunal. Thus the nature 
of the first proceeding precluded a final decision 
of the questions there raised, while the nature of 
the second proceeding required such decision." 
(Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N.Y. 484, 1 N.E. (2d) 
975, 105 A.L.R, 1401 at 1405). 
The order denying Burton's motion to dismiss Car-
ter's interpleader complaint did not finally determine the 
issues of that lawsuit. It was but preliminary to a final 
judgment which would be entered after trial on the 
merits. An order denying a motion to dismiss is but 
a preliminary order not finally adjudicating the issues. 
(Rule 12(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). A motion 
to dismiss does not call for adjudication on the merits 
of the case but is concerned solely with the question of 
whether the pleadings sustain the cause of action. 
(Daehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, D.C.D.C. 
1953,116 Fed. Sup. 68; SavadaBros. v. Conville, D.C.Pa. 
1948, 8 F.R.D. 127). 
This affidavit should be stricken from the record on 
appeal. 
2. Motion of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Com-
pany, Trustee, to intervene in the instant action; order 
making Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, Trustee, 
a party to said action and its motion to set aside the 
garnishee judgment against garnishee-respondent. 
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These documents and the action represented thereby 
are certainly immateral and irrelevant to the issue on 
this appeal. While the record on appeal shows that 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, Trustee, was 
made a party to this action, it does not show the dispo-
sition by the Court of its motion to set aside the gar-
nishee judgment. These documents should not have 
been placed in the record on appeal. They give no as-
sistance in determining the validity of the garnishee 
judgment as between plaintiff-appellant and the gar-
nishee-respondent. They should be stricken. 
3. District Court file in action of Samuel J. Car-
ter, etc. vs. Phyllis Lang, etc., Civil Action 148659. 
(a) This file covers an interpleader action 
filed by Samuel J, Carter as Executor of the Estate 
of John Lang, deceased, and as an individual against 
Phyllis Lang, J. Robert Lang, Wilford M. Burton, 
and George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, 
Utah. The file was never introduced in evidence at 
the hearing of the motion of the garnishee-respond-
ent to set aside, annul and declare void the garnishee 
judgment against said Carter in his representative 
capacity aforesaid. It therefore could not be con-
sidered by the trial court in the determination of 
this motion. The affidavit of Amoss, discussed in 
(a) supra, was an attempt by counsel for the plain-
tiff-appellant to dragoon this file into the record 
on appeal. ;:: 
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"Documentary evidence consisting of copies 
of court records in other proceedings are not 
properly a part of the record and cannot be con-
sidered on appeal, where the evidence is not re-
ported, the trial judge made no report of material 
facts found by him, and there is nothing to show 
that such copies were all the evidence presented 
at the hearing below." (Syllabus). (Damon v. 
Damon, 312 Mass. 268, 44 N.E.(2d) 657,143 A.L.R. 
463). 
"The record contains no copy of the answer 
of the defendant Laura Powers in the partition 
suit and no statement of its substance. We cannot 
consider a copy of Laura Powers' answer attached 
as an exhibit to the application for the writ and 
made from an abstract of title used on the trial. 
References in the statement of facts to pages of 
the abstract on which other instruments which 
were copied in the statement of facts appear do 
not make the answer of Laura Powers a part of 
the record when it is nowhere copied or referred 
to in the statement of facts." (Davis v. First 
Nat. Bank, 139 Tex. 36, 161 S.W.(2d) 467, 144 
A.L.R, 1). 
(b) The institution and pendency of said Civil 
Action No. 148,659 and the issues therein involved 
are matters entirely irrelevant to the issues raised 
by the aforesaid motion of Carter as Executor, etc, 
to annul the garnishee judgment. 
The District Court file in this action should be 
stricken from the record on appeal. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS PROCEEDED IN 
THIS ACTION AGAINST CARTER IN HIS CA-
PACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE AND 
UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF JOHN LANG, D E C E A S E D , AND NOT 
AGAINST CARTER AS AN INDIVIDUAL. 
The copy of the writ of garnishment served on 
Carter (R-l) was addressed to him in his capacity as 
Executor. He answered the same in his capacity as "Ex-
ecutor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased" (R-l) , 
and by his answers he specifically declared that his pos-
session of the sum of $9,375.00 was in his role as Exec-
utor and not as an individual. The garnishee judgment 
(R-4) was against "Samuel J. Carter as Executor of the 
Estate of John Lang, deceased"; it was not against 
Carter as an individual. The garnishee execution (R-5) 
based on said garnishee judgment was against Carter 
as Executor. The notice of appeal in this action (R-17) 
designated the order appealed from as "setting aside, 
annulling and declaring void that certain garnishee 
judgment rendered in this action on the 28th day of 
February, 1964, against Samuel J . Carter, Executor of 
the Estate of John Lang and in favor of plaintiff above 
named" (R-17) (Italics supplied). 
In its manifest, therefore, on the face of the record 
that Carter was before the District Court as Executor 
of the Lang Estate and not as an individual. He is 
before this Court in his role as Executor and not as an 
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individual. The plaintiff-appellant, by her own action, 
chose to bring Carter before the Court in his representa-
tive capacity and not as an individual. 
The foregoing facts proved by the record on appeal 
decisively deny the assertion by plaintiff-appellant found 
at the top of page 12 of her brief to the effect that "the 
proceeding is not against Mr. Carter in his representa-
tive capacity as executor of the estate of John Lang, 
but rather in his capacity as a personal debtor to the 
defendant. In the subject case no attempt is being made 
to substitute Mr. Carter as a party for the deceased." 
POINT III 
A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF A DE-
CEASED PERSON CAN SUE OR BE SUED, OR 
CAN BE A PARTY TO AN ACTION OR PRO-
CEEDING IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 
REPRESENTATIVE, ONLY IN THE STATE 
WHERE HE WAS APPOINTED, AND HIS ROLE 
AS EXTENDED PERSONALITY OF THE DE-
EASED DOES NOT EXIST EXTRATERRITOR-
IALLY BUT ONLY WITHIN THE FOUR COR-
NERS OF THE STATE OF HIS APPOINTMENT, 
EXCEPT WHERE, BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE 
OR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT THE COURT'S 
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE LITIGA-
TION ITSELF IS ATTACKED. 
I. This case is governed by the general rule. The 
above principle of law is firmly established in Utah. 
(Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake 'County, et al., 
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2 Utah (2d) 227, 272 Pac. (2d) 157). I t is also the law 
of the State of California (Kaplan v. Superior Court, 
191 Cal. App.(2d) 482, 12 Cal. Rep. 781, 782; Winbigler 
v. Shattuck, 40 Cal. App. 562,195 Pac. 707). The doctrine 
is generally applied (MacMaster v. Gould, 239 N.Y. 606, 
147 N.E. 214, 40 A.L.R. 792; Nat. Bank of Topeka, et al. 
v. Mitchell, et al., 154 Kan. 276, 118 Pac. (2d) 519; 4 
Bancroft's Probate Practice (2d), Sec. 1225 p. 573; Le-
febure, et al. v. Baker, et a l , 60 Mont. 193, 220 Pac. 1111). 
"If we go back to the historic origin of the 
executor's position, we find that he once took the 
assets in his own right. Executors in Earlier En-
glish Law by Holmes, 9 Harvard L. Rev. 42. No 
reason could then be given why he should not 
be sued wherever he could be found. But at the 
present day both executors and administrators 
hold the assets of the estate in a fiduciary cap-
acity. The will is the source of the executor's 
power, and letters testamentary are evidence of 
his authority, but the rights and liabilities of both 
executors and administrators in respect to the 
fund in their hands are like those of trustees. 
The wide distinction between the nature of the 
title of executors and administrators has disap-
peared, but this essential difference as to the 
source of title remains: The foreign administra-
tor exists only by virtue of the statute of another 
state; the executor's authority springs from the 
will and not from the letters testamentary." (Mac-
Master v. Gould, supra). 
The plaintiff-appellant proceeded against Carter, as 
above demonstrated in Point II , in his capacity as a 
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foreign executor by the issuance of the writ of garnish-
ment against him in such capacity. Carter answered 
the writ as Executor of the Lang Estate. The garnishee 
judgment was against Carter as Executor of the Lang 
Estate, and the execution garnishment ran against him 
in the same capacity. Carter as a California executor 
did not and does not exist in Utah. The plaintiff-appel-
lant, therefore proceeded against less than a shadow — a 
non-axistent personality and entity. The garnishee judg-
ment she obtained has no legal efficacy; it is a blank 
piece of paper. Under the rule announced, Carter as 
California executor was authorized to appear specially 
on his motion to set aside this imaginative, fictitious 
judgment of no legal effect. The District Court had 
no alternative but to cancel and annul this fictitious 
judgment, 
2. This case is not within any exception to the 
general rule. Plaintiff-appellant, under Point I I of her 
brief, asserts that the garnishee judgment in this action 
may be sustained under an exception to the general rule. 
The complete answer to this contention is that there is 
not an iota of evidence in the record on appeal that there 
were or are any funds of the estate within the jurisdiction 
of the District Court of Salt Lake County which must 
be disposed of or preserved. There is a presumption, in 
the absence of negative proof, that inasmuch as Carter 
was and is a California executor the funds are within 
the State of California and under the jurisdiction of the 
Superior Court of Orange County. No effort has been 
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made by plaintiff-appellant to prove that the funds were 
or are within the State of Utah. The record is completely 
silent on that point. Secondly, Carter as Executor of 
the Lang Estate has been guilty of no act which could 
stamp him as "an individual wrong-doer." He promptly 
responded to the interrogatories of the Avrit of garnish-
ment. He honestly stated that he held funds as Execu-
tor of the Lang Estate "owing to defendant (J . Eobert 
Lang) in settlement of an action brought against me as 
such Executor by defendant and others." In his response 
he made no claim to these funds as an individual. Thirdly, 
there is no failure of justice in the action of Judge Van 
Cott in annulling the fictitious garnishee judgment 
against the California executor. If the exception exists 
it can be justified only in those instances where a creditor 
is denied other relief or the enforcement of his rights 
is an onerous and almost impossible accomplishment. 
Such is not the fact in the instant case. The California 
courts were open to her at all times to enforce her claim 
against the funds in the possession of the California exec-
utor. 
This case might well end at this point. 
POINT IV 
THE FUNDS HELD BY CARTER AS CALIFOR-
NIA EXECUTOR DO NOT REPRESENT A DIS-
TRIBUTIVE SHARE OF THE LANG ESTATE. 
Carter in his answer to the second interrogatory 
contained in the writ of garnishment answered: "Yes — 
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as such executor I have in my possession $9,375.00 owing 
to defendant in settlement of an action brought against 
me as such executor by defendant and others." (Italics 
supplied.) There is no denial of Carter 's statement in the 
record on appeal. It stands uncontroverted and undenied. 
These funds do not represent the defendant's distributive 
share in the Lang Estate inasmuch as there has been no 
segregation of the estate's assets for purposes of distri-
bution to the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. They 
were funds which remained part of the estate's assets but 
which the executor intended to use in payment of the set-
tlement of the defendant's claim against him. There can-
not be found in the record on appeal any evidence other 
than the assertion made by Carter in his return to the 
writ of garnishment identifying these funds. It therefore 
follows that the argument and authorities presented in 
Point I of plaintiff-appellant's brief do not relate to or 
cover the situation in the present case. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE FUNDS HELD BY THE 
CALIFORNIA EXECUTOR AND AS PART OF 
THE ASSETS OF A CALIFORNIA ESTATE AND 
THEREFORE COULD NOT RENDER A BIND-
ING OR EFFECTIVE JUDGMENT DISPOSING 
OF THE SAME. 
The record on appeal shows conclusively that Carter 
held these funds in his role as California executor, l ie 
made a voluntary appearance in the garnishment pro-
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ceedings by filing his return to the writ of garnishment. 
He conferred jurisdiction of the Court over himself per-
sonally, but he could not and did not confer jurisdiction 
of the Court over the res. The res in this instance were 
the funds in his possession as executor appointed by a 
California court. It was beyond his authority to confer 
upon the District Court any jurisdiction over these funds. 
In the case of Bristol v. Brent, 36 Utah, 108, 103 Pac 
1076 at 1079, the Court wrote: 
"The regularity of this service, in so far as it 
is personal to the garnishee, may be waived by 
him, and he may appear before the court, either 
in person or by answer, if the law authorizes one 
to be made and filed, and thereby confer jurisdic-
tion over his person. But when the garnishee has 
thus conferred jurisdiction upon the court over 
his person, only one of the essential elements to 
its complete jurisdiction to proceed in the case 
is present. The other, jurisdiction over the res, 
is still lacking. While the defendant, no doubt, 
may insist that, unless the court have jurisdiction 
over the person of the garnishee, the debt owing 
from the garnishee to the defendant cannot be 
seized, yet the defendant cannot prevent the gar-
nishee from waiving any defects in the service in 
so far as it affects merely the jurisdiction of the 
court over the person of the garnishee. But 
when it affects the res, the very thing to be taken 
from the defendant, he may insist upon a full 
compliance with the law, and without such com-
pliance the court can acquire no jurisdiction over 
it without the consent of the defendant. Whether 
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the court has jurisdiction over the res or not, 
therefore, does not depend on whether the gar-
nishee objects, but it depends entirely on whether 
the statute, by virtue of which alone the court is 
authorized to act, has been complied with. If the 
return of the officer discloses an essential defect 
in this regard, the court is without power to pro-
ceed, and hence should arrest the proceedings on 
its own motion." 
This rule has been followed in a great number of 
cases. 
"The court had no jurisdiction of the res in 
this case, and therefore was in no position to 
render a binding or effective judgment in so far 
as the property or credits of the principal defen-
dant were concerned." (Federal Truck Co. v. 
Mayer, 216 Mo. App. 443, 270 S.W. 407). 
"As the justice was without jurisdiction of 
the res (the real subject matter) for two reasons: 
first, that the service of jjrocess was invalid and 
not cured by appearance although appearance was 
made; and, second, because the subject matter 
itself is not in the state nor subject to the process 
of its courts * * *. The answer of the garnishee, 
setting up its non-residence, was not controverted, 
so far as the record shows, and must be taken as 
true. That establishes a want of jurisdiction by 
showing that the subject matter is beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court. I t is an 
utter want of jurisdiction, in defiance of which 
the justice went on and gave judgment. * * * 
What purports to be the return of service being 
void under the statute and decisions of this court, 
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it could not confer any jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, although the garnishee appeared and sub-
jected itself to the jurisdiction of the court." 
(Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Rogers, et al., 52 
W. Va.* 450, 62 L.R.A. 178, 189). 
"Obviously, the trial court was without power 
to render a judgment against the garnishee in the 
first instance because the court was without juris-
diction of the res. A judgment rendered without 
jurisdiction is, of course, void." (Upjohn Co. v. 
Board of Commissioners, 25 N.M. 526, 185 Pac. 
279). 
The funds held by Carter as Executor until actually 
paid by him to the person entitled thereto remained part 
of the assets of the California estate and were under 
the jurisdiction and protection of the Orange County 
Superior Court. While Carter acknowledged in his gar-
nishment answer that he was indebted as executor to 
J. Robert Lang, this acknowledgment was simply his 
statement of an indebtedness due from the California 
executor to Lang. Unless and until Carter as executor 
paid these funds to Lang they remained part of the 
California estate. There had been no segregation of the 
same from the general assets of the estate. These funds 
did not arise from a distribution of the California estate 
to the devisees or legatees of John Lang, deceased. No-
thing in the record on appeal denies that these funds, 
together with all other assets of the estate, were within 
the State of California and not within the jurisdiction 
of the Utah courts. The consequence is that no judgment 
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of a Utah court could affect this res which was beyond 
its jurisdiction. 
The verity and legal soundness of the conclusion 
above set forth that the Utah District Court could not ac-
quire jurisdiction over the res is confirmed by posing the 
simple question: Could J. Robert Lang have sued Carter 
as California executor of the Estate of John Lang, de-
ceased, in the District Court of Salt Lake County? The 
answer is an emphatic and unqualified "No." This con-
clusion is supported by the statement of Mr. Justice 
Peckham in the case of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S., 226, 
49 L.ed. 1028, 25 S.Ct. 625: 
"If there be a law of the state providing for 
the attachment of the debt, then if the garnishee 
be found in that state, and process be personally 
served upon him therein, we think the court there-
by acquires jurisdiction over him, and can garnish 
the debt due from him to the debtor of the plain-
tiff and condemn it, provided the garnishee him-
self could be sued by his creditor in that state." 
(Italics supplied). 
The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States, supra, was adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Utah in Bristol v. Brent, 38 Utah, 58, 110 Pac. 
356 at page 362: 
"The United States Supreme Court, to our 
minds, makes it quite clear that a debt can only be 
condemned in the hands of a garnishee in a juris-
diction where the creditor of such garnishee could 
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himself enforce payment of sack debt against the 
garnishee. This is logical, for the reason that 
if nothing tangible is attached by the process of 
garnishment, and nothing is arrested except the 
obligation to pay the debt by the garnishee, it 
must follow that a court may not disregard the 
conditions upon which the obligation to pay rests, 
and may not enforce it against the garnishee un-
less the garnishee's creditor could enforce it at 
the time when, and at the place where, the action 
is commenced against the creditor of the gar-
nishee.7' (Italics supplied). 
I t is clear beyond all doubt that J. Eobert Lang could 
not have sued Carter as California executor of the Estate 
of John Lang, deceased, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah. (See Point I I I supra). Beyond 
peradventure it then follows that a creditor of J. Robert 
Lang could not garnish Carter as executor aforesaid in 
an action against said J. Robert Lang in said District 
Court, and that garnishee judgment resultant upon said 
action is absolutely void. 
The conclusion is irrefutable that not only the in-
debtedness due from Carter as California executor to 
J. Robert Lang but also funds in the custody of such 
California executor intended for the payment of such 
indebtedness were in the custody of the California Super-
ior Court of Orange County, State of California. The con-
clusion of the matter may thus succinctly be stated: 
"While property or money is in custodia legis, 
the officer holding it is the mere hand of the 
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court; his possession is the possession of the 
court, and to interfere therewith is to invade the 
jurisdiction of the court itself, an officer so sit-
uated being bound solely by the orders and judg-
ments of the court whose mere agent he is, and 
having no right to make any disposition of such 
money or property without the consent of his own 
court, express or implied. Hence, in the absence 
of express statutory authority therefor, the gen-
eral rule is that property or funds in custodia legis 
are not subject to either attachment or garnish-
ment." (6 Am. Jur . (2d), Sec. 196, p. 702). 
CONCLUSION 
Carter was and is an officer of the Superior Court 
of Orange County, California, being appointed by that 
court Executor of the Estate and under the last will and 
testament of John Lang, deceased. The plaintiff-appel-
lant proceeded against Carter in his representative capa-
city as Executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased. 
The garnishee judgment obtained by the plaintiff-appel-
lant was against Carter in his representative capacity. 
Carter as a California executor could not and cannot 
be sued or proceeded against in a Utah court. Neither 
can Carter in his representative capacity sue in a Utah 
court. Carter, as a California executor, by his garnish-
ment answer conferred jurisdiction on the Utah court 
over his person, but he could not and did not confer 
jurisdiction over the res. The res was funds of the Cal-
ifornia estate in the possession of the executor. The 
garnishee judgment against Carter as Executor of the 
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Lang Estate was therefore void, and the District Court 
had no alternative except to nullify the same. I t is 
respectfully submitted that the order appealed from 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
Attorneys for Garnishee-Respondent 
{InterveMor-Respondent) 
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I, FRANKLIN RITEE, one of the attorneys for 
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hereby certify that on the /^**^day of April, 1965, three 
copies of the foregoing Brief were mailed by me to Dud-
ley M. Amoss, attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant; said 
copies of said Brief were inclosed in an envelope with 
postage prepaid, addre^ed to said Amossj^t 974 East 3rd 
South Street, Salt J^m^City, Utah. 
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